To the point: AI coding assistants can be circumvented by breaking malicious requests into small code steps to bypass their security checks.
Researchers have shown that GitHub Copilot rejects malicious requests in chat, but executes them when broken down into smaller, inconspicuous steps in the code editor. The phenomenon also affects Claude (Anthropic) and Gemini (Google).
A recent study by Abhishek Kumar and Carsten Maple demonstrates a security vulnerability in modern AI coding assistants: systems that reject explicit requests for malicious code execute the same functionality when the request is broken down into small, seemingly harmless steps. The researchers tested this behavior on GitHub Copilot, Claude by Anthropic, and Gemini by Google.
The core problem lies in the different treatment of requests depending on context and presentation. In the chat interface, the models’ security mechanisms activate checks that filter potentially dangerous requests. In the code editor, however, the assistants interpret fragmented requests as natural steps in a development process — without applying the same level of control.
For CTOs, this means that using AI coding assistants carries an increased security risk, especially when security policies are based on the assumption of implemented protective measures. It requires additional code review processes to recognize that seemingly harmless code segments implement a previously rejected malicious functionality.
Source: thehackernews.com · Published 8 July 2026
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