The bottom line: Attackers with admin access can abuse Windows Bind Links to redirect legitimate file paths to malicious binaries, bypassing EDR, AMSI, and AppLocker controls.
Bitdefender researchers have documented three techniques that abuse Windows Bind Links to deceive EDR sensors and bypass Windows security mechanisms such as AMSI and AppLocker. The attacks require pre-existing administrator rights on the target machine.
Bitdefender has identified three exploitation variants: File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding. All three exploit the Windows Bind Filter driver (bindflt.sys), which redirects file paths in memory. The techniques are effective on Windows 10 RS4 and later, as well as Windows 11.
In File-Binding, attackers redirect paths to trusted DLLs or files—for example, amsi.dll—and serve modified versions instead that export identical functions but disable malware detection. Process-Binding extends the concept to executables: the operating system displays a legitimate process like winver.exe externally, but actually executes cmd.exe. This bypasses allowlists and process-based signatures. Silo-Binding leverages Windows isolation technology in containers to present different file system views inside and outside isolated environments—malware appears as a trusted application.
Bitdefender demonstrated practical bypasses against AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon, as well as the execution of Invoke-Mimikatz under a spoofed process identity. Microsoft rated the vulnerabilities as low severity because admin privileges are required. However, Bitdefender argues that this equates to Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) attacks—an established post-compromise evasion vector. The researchers do not describe these techniques as remote code execution vulnerabilities, but rather as evasion mechanisms following successful compromise.
Windows 24H2 introduces a veto mechanism for bind link creation. Bitdefender, however, assesses this as only partial mitigation: it is limited to newer systems, applies only in certain scenarios, and can be circumvented. The researchers instead recommend resolving the actual target file object rather than blindly trusting the file path returned by the kernel.
Source: www.csoonline.com · Published July 15, 2026
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